This paper develops a gravity model with sector-level input-output linkages in production. In contrast to a traditional gravity approach, which relies on direct gross exports between bilateral trade partners, our model additionally includes (1) domestic and global value chain linkages between goods and services sectors, (2) bilateral tariffs that affect direct production for a final destination as well as indirect production (shipped via third countries) to a final destination and (3) value added rather than gross production. Including input-output linkages implies that domestic production of intermediates can serve as inputs in foreign products and subsequently be exported "indirectly" to a final destination. Our input-output model can be taken to the sectoral World Input Output Database (WIOD) and can be used to evaluate trade policy shocks. While our framework is entirely general, we use it to predict the impact of the UK's withdrawal from the European Union ("Brexit") in terms of value added production and employment for every individual EU country involved. We find that Brexit hits the UK relatively harder than the EU-27. In contrast to other studies, we find EU-27 losses from Brexit to be substantially higher than hitherto believed.
Introduction
Production processes are increasingly fragmented across national boundaries. The emergence of global production networks imply that one can no longer consider bilateral trade in isolation when evaluating trade policy or idiosyncratic shocks (Johnson, 2014; Acemoglu et al., 2012) . A full assessment of trade shocks requires new models that consider global value chain linkages and trade costs worldwide. The starting point of this paper is that a country's production can be exported either directly or indirectly to a final destination. Indirect exports are intermediates that are used in the production process of other countries before they are shipped to the final destination. A traditional gravity model would not take these international production linkages into account and typically only consider the direct shipments between bilateral trade partners 2 . In this paper, we develop and explicitly solve a model that allows us to separately identify all the channels through which tariff changes operate. This results in a gravity model that overcomes the limitations of a traditional gravity approach and that derives closed-form solutions which allow for comparative statics on tariff changes. We then use the model to simulate the impact of the UK's withdrawal from the EU ("Brexit"). Our approach complements existing papers on Brexit that have used either standard gravity or simulated general equilibrium models to estimate the effects of Brexit 3 .
The model that we develop is probably closest to the one by Noguera (2012) which features indirect exports in a value added setting. Whereas Noguera (2012) considers aggregate trade flows at the country-level, however, we develop a model with both final and intermediate trade flows at the more disaggregate sector-level. This has a number of important advantages. First, trade tariffs vary substantially across sectors, which means that a failure to account for this heterogeneity across sectors may lead to biased results. Second, as intra-industry trade between countries is substantial, it is important to allow two distinct countries to be active in the same sector producing similar goods. Third, our model allows for differences in the trade elasticity across sectors, meaning that consumers (and firms) can react differently to price changes in different sectors. Fourth, it exploits Noguera (2012) , Foster-McGregor and Stehrer (2013) , Timmer et al. (2014) , Timmer et al. (2015) and others that have investigated inter-sector and international linkages in global value chains albeit to address different questions. Our approach also differs from David et al. (2013) , who assess US employment effects of Chinese import penetration at the regional level but do not consider the input-output linkages between industries. The novelty of our approach is that we consider all the downstream employment effects that stem from a change in domestic value added following a trade shock.
Another line of work in recent years has gone into identifying the welfare gains and losses from trade policy but has been less about inter-sectoral linkages and intermediates (see Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare, 2013 for an overview). An increasing number of papers in trade also turn to input-output data in the context of trade policy but with a different focus, e.g. Blanchard et al. (2016) who show that countries which are more connected in global value chains have lower tariff protection between them, Dhingra et al. (2017) who evaluate Brexit on UK household income levels and Caliendo et al. (2015) who assess the welfare effects of NAFTA. Finally, several studies in trade have now shown that gross trade flows do not necessarily reflect the domestic production underlying 4 In his basic gravity model, Magee (2008) finds that bilateral trade flows are estimated to increase by 82% after countries engage in a regional agreement and this effect is significant across different econometric specifications. On the contrary, the variable capturing trade diversion reduces imports from outside by 2.9% but is not significant across different econometric specifications, suggesting that trade diversion is small compared to the direct trade effects. 5 We use the release 2016 of the World-Input-Output Database (WIOD). This sector-level database provides information about the origin and destination of intermediate and final goods and services in 56 sectors using ISIC Rev.4 for 43 countries, and a residual rest of the world between the years 2000 and 2014. Dietzenbacher et al. (2013) describes in great detail the procedure that was followed to construct these World Input-Output Tables.
4 the trade flow (Koopman et al., 2014; Bernard et al., 2017) 6 .
A limitation of the WIOD sector-level data is the lack of information on the underlying firm distribution. Using this database, we cannot know which firms import intermediaries and which firms are the exporting ones. However, whereas firm-level studies with information on their trading activity are often limited in their geographic scope and typically only include firms from one country 7 , WIOD has a worldwide coverage that allows for the study of production networks covering all countries. Another advantage of using WIOD is that all upstream and downstream sectors can be identified for any sector in the production network, allowing for the construction of input-output linkages.
WIOD provides us with observations on the main variables required for our analysis of the impact of a trade shock like Brexit, i.e. trade flows, value added shares and production input-output linkages. We complement this data with estimates of sector-level trade elasticities and employment elasticities that we obtain from the literature. We consider both a "soft" Brexit (the "Norwegian scenario"), where the UK continues to be part of the Single Market but faces increased Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs), as well as a "hard" Brexit scenario where Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) tariffs between the EU-27 and the UK are put in place in addition to the NTBs.
Our model predictions indicate that the UK is hit relatively harder than the rest of the EU-27 in both scenarios. In either case, Brexit reduces economic activity in the UK around three times more than in the EU-27. The UK will experience a drop in value added production as a percentage of GDP of 1.21% under a soft Brexit and up to 4.47% under a hard Brexit scenario. This corresponds to UK job losses of 139,860 jobs in the "soft" Brexit and 526,830 jobs in the "hard" Brexit scenario.
For the EU-27, the absolute job losses are larger, with the numbers of EU-27 jobs lost from Brexit varying between 284,440 jobs and 1,209,470 jobs respectively which corresponds to value added losses as a percentage of GDP of 0.38% for the "soft" and 1.54% for the "hard" Brexit. The losses in value added and jobs differ substantially across EU-27 member states. EU-27 member states that stand to lose most from Brexit are countries with close historical ties to the UK (e.g. Ireland,
Malta
) and small open economies on the European continent (e.g. Belgium and the Netherlands).
The Brexit impact varies across countries due to differences in sectoral composition. As shown by Acemoglu et al. (2012) , it is the network centrality of sectors that determines the impact of an 6 Bernard et al. (2017) empirically show that many products shipped by manufacturing firms are not produced in-house, but are "carry-along trade", i.e. gross export sales are much larger than the domestic production shipped. 7 Viegelahn and Vandenbussche (2014) use micro-level data for India and have information on firm-level importing and exporting activities of Indian firms, but do not know the firms they are buying from or are selling to.
5 aggregate shock through a "cascade effect" in the input-output network. Under Brexit, we consider different tariffs across sectors, and therefore the propagation of tariff shocks differs depending on the sectoral composition of the economy. A sector that only has a few linkages with other sectors may not affect aggregate output much even when it is subject to high tariffs, as opposed to a sector that is very central in the production network. Our results take the network centrality and the number of sectoral production linkages into account when estimating the loss in value added and jobs caused by Brexit.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we develop the theoretical model and obtain an expression for a country-sector's value added production and its determinants on the basis of which we obtain clear predictions on the effects of trade shocks. In Section 3, we explain the methodology and describe the data we use. Section 4 presents the results of the Brexit application.
Section 5 compares our results to existing results in the literature and Section 6 concludes. The model is based on the Armington assumption, which means that goods produced by different sources are imperfect substitutes simply because of their origin. As a result, within a sector, goods from different countries can coexist in the same destination market, even though their prices may differ as they are determined by the country-sector's marginal production cost and costs of trade with the destination country 9 . Consumers (and firms) have a love-for-variety and prefer to consume positive amounts of each available variety.
Consumer Demand
The representative consumer in country k derives utility from consuming quantities of an aggregate final good F k :
which is a Cobb-Douglas combination of quantities F s k consumed of final goods from all sectors s ∈ S, with α s k the corresponding share in total expenditures. This sector-specific final good is a CES aggregate across all countries the good can be purchased from,
8 We need at least three symbols in the model to denote countries and sectors because input-output models typically consider three nodes in a supply chain: (1) the supplier of intermediate inputs, (2) the final producer and (3) the consumer.
9 As in Noguera (2012) , production and trade costs are the only determinants of prices in our model. This does not imply that firms cannot charge markups. In WIOD, however, we have no information on the underlying firm-level distribution within each sector. The absence of markups in the model is assumed at sectoral level.
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where σ s > 1 is the elasticity of substitution (for final goods) between the countries of origin within sector s 10 .
Producers
In country k's sector z, output Y kz is produced according to a Cobb-Douglas technology combining labor L kz and intermediate inputs X kz 11 :
where β kz represents the share of intermediate expenditures in total sales of country k's sector z. 
where X s kz denotes the real aggregate demand of intermediates from sector s by country k's sector z, and γ s kz is the corresponding share in total expenditures on inputs. The sector-specific intermediate good X s kz is a CES aggregate across all countries the input can be purchased from:
where ρ s > 1 is the elasticity of substitution (for intermediate goods) between the countries of origin within sector s 12 . Note that this nested Cobb-Douglas-CES structure is similar to that of the consumer demand aggregates.
Utility and Profit Maximization
Let w kz denote the price of labor in country k's sector z (L kz ) and p kz the price of output from kz (Y kz ). Given iceberg-type trade barriers, in order to satisfy country j's demand of one unit of kz, kz needs to produce τ kz j units, with τ kz j > 1. The price of one unit of kz's output in destination j 10 For simplicity, we assume this sector-specific elasticity of substitution to be the same across all countries k. 11 Following several standard trade models, we allow only for one factor of production. This assumption can be relaxed, for instance by accounting for high-and low skilled labor. 12 For simplicity, we assume this sector-specific elasticity of substitution to be the same across all countries k. 
nominal demands then equal:
13 The assumption that firms and consumers share the same price elasticities allows us to substantially simplify the analysis, as in Noguera (2012) . 14 The assumption of perfect pass-through inherent to this theoretical framework is a limiting assumption since pass-through depends on firm size with larger firms having lower pass-through rates (Amiti et al. (2014) (6) and (7) into Equation (8) allows to solve for prices p is . Substituting these into the price index P s k and plugging the resulting expression for P s k into (6) and (7) results in the following gravity equations for intermediate and final bilateral exports and equilibrium price indices:
) is a measure of the importance of goods from sector z for producers and consumers in country j. It takes into account (i) the dependence of producers in all sectors s in country j on intermediates from sector z through θ js γ z js β js and (ii) the importance of goods from sector z in the final demand by households in country j (through α z j ) and the total income these households earn in all sectors s in j (through θ js (1 − β js )).
Equation (9) relates bilateral intermediate trade between firms in country-sector kz and countrysector js to (i) the economic masses of source and destination relative to the world, (ii) the importance of inputs in the destination's production (β js ) and the importance of sector z goods within these inputs (γ z js ), (iii) the bilateral trade costs between countries k and j in sector z (τ kz j ), and (iv) outward and inward multilateral resistance terms (Π kz and P z j ). Similarly, Equation (10) relates bilateral final goods trade between firms in country-sector kz and the consumers in country j to (i) the economic masses of source (y kz ) and destination ( 
Input-Output Production Linkages
Dividing both sides of Equation (9) 
Plugging the technical coefficients into the market clearing in condition in (8), we have
which can be summarized for all countries and sectors as
where
where f j is the (S * N ) x 1 vector of country j's final demands and A the (S * N ) x (S * N ) global bilateral input-output matrix at the sectoral level. The system in Equation (12) can be written as
with I the (S * N ) x (S * N ) identity matrix. If (I − A) can be inverted, we can find the solution for nominal output as
where L is known as the Leontief inverse matrix. Each element L kz is of L is the Leontief coefficient that measures the total of dollars worth of country-sector kz goods required to meet 1 dollar worth of is' final demand. This value combines kz goods used as inputs in is directly as well as kz goods used as inputs in other industries which then also produce inputs for is. Using this, we can obtain country k's nominal output in sector z as
where we substituted the gravity relation from Equation (10) for the final value f is j flowing from country-sector is to the consumer in country j. Finally, we can transform this into value added production. For this purpose, we assume that the value added share of a country-sector's production is the part that is generated by its labor. Looking back at the production function in (3), the value created by country-sector kz after accounting for the intermediates used is captured by the share of labor 1 − β kz . Hence, following Noguera (2012) we find the value added embodied in kz's nominal production y kz as (1 − β kz )y kz where 1 − β kz ≡ v kz is the value added to output ratio. The total value added production by kz can thus be written as
This value added production (and the jobs depending on it) might be severely impacted in the case of a trade shock, which is the subject of the next section.
Evaluating Trade Shocks
In this section, we examine the impact of a trade shock such as Brexit on a country-sector's value added production. Equation (16) shows that an import tariff imposed on a specific good will not only affect the producer of the good, but also the suppliers of goods and services whose output is used as an input in the production of the good. This implies that when the UK imposes a tariff on German cars, the Belgian steel sector which supplies inputs to the German car industry will also be affected, even in the absence of a UK import tariff on Belgian steel. This channel is missing in a traditional gravity approach but can be captured by our model. The impact of a trade shock can be examined by considering what would happen when the variable trade costs (τ ) change 16 . Our interest lies in the change dva kz in country-sector kz's value added production, which we find to
from which we can derive the following general result. Rising trade costs reduce bilateral trade flows e is j between any country-sector is and j. As kz has an interest L kz is in each of these bilateral flows, va kz will decrease as well. The drop depends on the magnitude of the change in relative trade costsτ is j between is and j and the corresponding trade elasticity σ s .
In Equation (17), we definedτ
as the proportionate change in tariffs τ is j relative to the proportionate changes in the multilateral resistance (MR) terms. When examining trade policy, it is important to take into account that the multilateral resistance (MR) terms will change along with the tariffs. Therefore, Equation (17) . As it is relative tariffs that matter rather than absolute tariffs to determine a country's global competitiveness, individual tariff changes should be compared with changes in the average tariff, which is captured by the multilateral resistance terms. Suppose, for instance, that the UK tariff on Belgian goods goes up with 3%. If the UK further raises its tariffs on all its other trading partners with 2%, the "real" or "relative" increases in the BE-UK tariff is only 1% (3% -2%). Therefore, what matters for a country-sector's production change dva kz is the tariff change it faces relative to the tariff change its competitors face.
Under Brexit, the only countries that are likely to face increased tariffs from the UK are the EU-27, whereas the tariffs the UK imposes on its other trading partners such as the US will not change.
16 In this application, any effect of the exchange rate on EU-UK trade is disregarded. We acknowledge that exchange rates have an important impact on the relative price of UK exports worldwide (and thus in the EU), possibly offsetting any change in tariffs. However, as major exporting firms tend to be major importing firms as well (see, for instance, Amiti et al., 2014) , the depreciated pound will increase their production cost which will translate in higher export prices. 17 See the Appendix for a detailed derivation.
This means that US goods will become relatively less expensive for the UK, even though the UK tariffs on US imports do not change. The reason is that Brexit actually decreases (i.e.τ U S,s U K < 0) the "relative" US-UK trade costs compared to EU-UK trade costs. As a result, some trade will be diverted from the EU27-UK to the US-UK. The MR changes dΠ is Π is and dP s j P s j are essential for trade diversion to happen. We can see this by disentangling the changeτ is j into its different components, namely the tariff change and the MR changes:
Equation (18) shows that the change in kz's value added production after a change in trade costs τ is a combination of a "trade destruction effect" (-) as a result of higher tariffs and a "trade diversion effect" (+) caused by the change in the multilateral resistance terms.
On the one hand, the "trade destruction effect" measures the drop in va kz that is caused by the reduced trade between any country-sector is and country j. This drop depends on how the output of country-sector kz is used by country i's sector s, as it is the latter sector's exports that will face increased protectionist measures from country j.
The "trade diversion effect", on the other hand, is driven by two channels. First, country-sector is will divert some of its exports away from j to alternative destinations that do not impose tariffs on its goods, since these destinations have now become relatively more attractive (i.e. less expensive)
for is to export to. This is caused by the increase in is' outward MR term Π is . Second, the fact that j increases the tariffs on its imports will raise the average price in market j which makes the market less competitive, captured by the increase in j's inward MR term P s j . As a result, any country i will find it easier to export to country j. Both the first and second channel of trade diversion increase the exports of is and hence its production, which results in an increase in its demand for inputs from country-sector kz, which in turn increases the latter's value added production va kz .
Therefore, the "trade diversion effect" will mitigate some of the negative "trade destruction effect" on va kz . The results can be summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1: The change in kz's value added production after a trade shock depends on two effects. First, the negative "trade destruction effect" indicates that the loss in va kz depends on kz's connection with each exporting country-sector is. The drop in va kz will be greater, (i) the higher is the trade elasticity in sector s (higher (σ s − 1)); (ii) the greater is the increase in protection imposed by j on sector s goods originating in country i (higher dτ is j τ is j ); (iii) the greater is the 14 production interlinkage of kz with is (higher L kz is ) and (iv) the stronger is the direct bilateral trade relation in both final and intermediate goods between i and j in sector s. Second, these negative effects will be mitigated through the "trade diversion" channel, as some of kz's production will be used in exports that are diverted to different destinations after the trade shock.
Equation (18) sums up the effects of a trade shock on va kz . It characterizes all the different channels through which a trade shock can affect a sector's output. It is clear that the impact of a trade shock such as Brexit on a given sector can be very different depending on a number of determinants that vary by sector. Strong production interlinkages (high L) with a large exporting sector (high e)
do not necessarily lead to large production losses (through the "trade destruction effect") in case this sector produces differentiated goods (making it insensitive to price changes, i.e. σ is low) or experiences only minor tariff increases (small dτ τ ). Accounting for this sectoral heterogeneity in a model with a closed-form solution on the effects of a tariff shock, contributes to the literature in an important way.
In the next section, we will apply our model to a specific trade shock. We will compute the production and employment effects of Brexit, in which the EU and the UK impose tariffs on each other's goods.
Methodology
This section takes the model to the data and simulates the effects of different scenarios of Brexit using input-output data from WIOD. For expositional simplicity, we explain the methodology by focusing on the effects of unilateral UK protection on EU goods, but the analysis is symmetric for EU protection against UK imports. We will investigate the impact on kz's production when the UK imposes tariffs on EU goods using Equation (18) 1819 .
Equation (18) consists of a trade destruction and diversion effect, where the latter derives from the changes in multilateral resistance (MR) terms. These MR terms are not observable, and not controlling for them in gravity estimation is what Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) call "the gold medal of classic gravity model mistakes". Empirically, there are several ways to deal with the issue of MR, see for instance Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003) , Bergstrand (2009) and Novy (2013) . Hummels (1999) and Feenstra (2015) suggest to control for MR using directional (exporter and importer) fixed effects in a gravity model based on past data series. However, in our analysis of Brexit, where we simulate the model to engage in future predictions, the inclusion of fixed effects
is not an option. The empirical findings in the literature on the magnitude of the trade diversion effect of import tariffs are ambiguous but seem to suggest that trade diversion effects tend to 18 Note that empirically we account for retaliation i.e. we consider both tariffs imposed by the UK as well as tariffs imposed by the EU-27, when computing losses in value added produced and jobs for each country involved. Put differently, we assume that in the case of a "hard" Brexit, the EU-27 also imposes MFN tariffs on UK goods of the same magnitude as the UK does. To simplify the exposition here, we focus on the case where the UK imposes tariffs because the analysis is completely symmetric for any other EU-27 country involved in Brexit. Further, we make the likely assumption that non-EU relationships remain unchanged after Brexit.
19 Our model only captures the static effects of a trade shock and it does not include dynamic effects such as access to foreign markets, firm investment and innovation, capital mobility and migration. In terms of the time horizon, we assume all effects to occur immediately after Brexit happens. However, it should be noted that it can take some time for our simulated outcomes to arise. Especially non-tariff barriers (NTBs) can have a lagged effect. Jung (2012) estimated that an adjustment period of 10 to 12 years could be in order. In which case the full effect of our simulated outcomes would be expected around 2030, which is also the time horizon adopted by most other Brexit papers.
be small 20 . Indeed, in order to divert trade, new business contacts have to be established, new contracts negotiated and so on, which takes some time to materialize. In our Brexit application, we therefore concentrate on the short-run effects and restrict Equation (18) to the first term that measures the "trade destruction effect". This is the first-order trade effect, which captures the main effects resulting from the Brexit's tariff changes. The drop in value added production as a result of increased UK trade protection on EU goods (higher τ EU,s U K ) under Brexit will thus be approximated by
Within this trade destruction effect we can now distinguish two different channels of value added loss by decomposing the trade destruction effect of UK protection into "direct" and "indirect"
losses. These refer, respectively, to the losses in value added of country-sector kz stemming from direct bilateral trade (in goods and services) with the UK and the value added losses arising through its production linkages with other affected sectors in other EU-27 countries. For any country-sector kz, the loss in va kz can be decomposed into a "direct" and "indirect" loss as follows
Equation (19) thus captures the effect on va kz of increased UK trade protection on EU-27 goods and services. Similarly, the effects of increased EU-27 protection on UK goods and services can be obtained from equation (19) by simply reversing the country of origin and destination 21 . In Section 4 we present both effects separately and combined to give an idea of the total effect of Brexit on EU-27 and UK value added production and employment.
20 There appears to be no consensus in the literature on the magnitude of trade diversion effects. Dai et al. (2014) use manufacturing trade data for 64 countries and find that Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) divert trade, particularly on the import-side. However, Magee (2008) using different gravity specifications estimates of the trade diversion effects of regional agreements to be small and their significance to depend on the specification used. Similarly, Soloaga and Wintersb (2001) found evidence of export diversion in a minority of FTAs i.e. only 2 out of 9 FTAs analyzed had substantial trade diversion. Dhingra et al. (2017) estimates the potential gains by non-EU countries arising from the reduced trade between the EU-27 and the UK. The non-EU gains turn out to be very small, approximately between 0.01 and 0.02% of GDP. Therefore, the mitigation effects of trade diversion are likely to be small. 21 Note that our theoretical framework predicts a loss in UK production even if we only consider trade protection imposed by the UK itself. The main mechanism is that it increases the price of (EU-27) inputs for UK firms and it decreases the demand for UK inputs that are embedded in EU-27 goods and services destined to the UK consumer.
Value Added Production Losses
In order to obtain an estimate of the value added losses, Equation ( For each country-sector, WIOD provides its total production, the inputs it needs from other countrysectors and how much of its output is used by other country-sectors in their production process. The first variable that we obtain from WIOD is the value added share of country-sector kz's production, v kz . This captures the value added, obtained as gross output minus gross intermediate inputs, per unit of gross output. We also obtain the Leontief coefficients, L kz is from WIOD, which are obtained using Equation (14) . In addition, again from WIOD we obtain the direct trade flows e is j from country is to country j, which are obtained by summing exports from is that are destined to country j to satisfy its final and intermediate demand.
Trade Elasticities
Another determinant which the losses from Brexit depend on is the sector-level trade elasticity. A trade elasticity measures the proportionate decrease in demand after a 1% increase in trade costs.
It captures the idea that higher UK tariffs and Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs) will increase the price of EU-27 products in the UK (and vice versa), which will lower UK consumers' demand of EU-27 goods as they substitute away to products of cheaper origin. This is captured by the elasticity of substitution σ s in sector s, from which the trade elasticity is derived as σ s − 1. As a result, the extent to which production decreases after Brexit depends on the trade elasticity.
The literature has shown that trade elasticities typically vary both across countries and sectors.
For example, Imbs and Méjean (2017) . We consider two Brexit scenarios, an optimistic ("soft Brexit") and a pessimistic ("hard Brexit") scenario. We refer to Dhingra et al. (2017) for more details on these scenarios. In short, in the "soft Brexit" scenario, the UK continues to belong to the EU Single Market and tariffs remain zero, while non-tariff barriers to trade (NTBs) increase by 2.77% 26 . The scenarios are summarized in Table 1 . In a "hard" Brexit scenario, the UK leaves the Single Market and trade between the EU-27 countries and the UK is governed by the World Trade Organization (WTO) rules. This implies an increase in trade tariffs from the current level of 0% to the sectoral "applied tariffs" imposed under the Most Favored Nations (MFN) clause, which differ by sector. These MFN tariffs are the tariffs that are currently imposed on goods traded between the United States and the EU, for instance. In Figure   1 , we present the unweighted current MFN tariffs according to WTO rules in the sectors contained in the WIOD database. These are the MFN tariffs from the EU perspective, i.e. those that the EU imposes on imports from abroad. In the "hard Brexit" scenario, we assume EU-UK and UK-EU trade to be subject to an increase in the trade tariffs on goods from 0% to the unweighted average MFN tariff in each sector that ranges from 0% in "Mining and quarrying", "Forestry" and "Electricity and Gas" to 9.1% in the case of Fishing products. Figure 1 gives an overview of the MFN tariffs that currently apply to trade between members of the WTO. Moreover, we assume that under a "hard Brexit" NTBs rise further to a tariff equivalent of 8.31%
27 .
26 This is similar to the case of Norway whose NTBs with the EU are 2.11% higher than for the EU members. The 2.77% is taken from Dhingra et al. (2017) . They compute a weighted average tariff equivalent for the current NTBs on US-EU trade, which amounts to 20.4%. Given that only 54% of this tariff equivalent is reducible, they only take into account an NTB tariff equivalent of ca. 11%. In the optimistic Brexit scenario, Dhingra et al. (2017) assume that the EU-UK trade will be subject to a NTB that is only one quarter of the one on EU-US trade, resulting in a tariff equivalent of 2.77%. 27 This corresponds to three quarters of the NTB on EU-US trade, see Dhingra et al. (2017) . 
Employment Losses
Combining the data gathered in the previous sections with Equation (19), we obtain the total value added production loss dva kz in country k's sector z. In order to transform these production losses in job losses, we need an employment elasticity. This elasticity measures the proportionate drop in employment after a 1% decrease in value added production. In our theoretical framework, our production function is characterized by constant return to scale. In theory, Hamermesh (1986) argued that a production function characterized by constant returns to scale is identified by an elasticity of 1. However, this differs from empirical evidence. Konings and Murphy (2006) use European firm level data and report employment elasticities with respect to value added for manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors below 1. They find the range of average employment elasticities between 0.57 and 0.72 in manufacturing sectors and 0.33 in non-manufacturing sectors.
Given that we also focus on European data, we use the lower bound of these sectoral estimates to obtain the effect of Brexit on employment. This implies that for every 1% drop in domestically produced value added, we assume employment to go down by 0.57 % in manufacturing and 0.33% in non-manufacturing sectors. Similar to the trade elasticities, the Brexit results on employment depend linearly on the choice of the employment elasticity. Thus, once we have obtained the relative drop in employment from the decrease in production, we can compute the absolute number of jobs lost by multiplying by the country-sector's total employment base 28 .
Results
Our approach is a simulation exercise rather than a regression type of analysis since we cannot use past data to estimate the hypothetical impact of Brexit given the unprecedented nature of this event 29 . For this reason, we use our theoretical model to make projections about the potential effects from different scenarios of Brexit.
From the theoretical model we know that the UK's consumption of EU-27 products will decrease after the introduction of import tariffs by the UK. Given that EU-27 producers also use UK inputs in their own production, some of the UK's own value added will go lost when it imposes import tariffs on EU-27 goods and services. For example, take a German car manufacturer that uses a UK insurance as part of its inputs. The introduction of an import tariff on German cars by the UK will decrease the demand for German cars in the UK, subsequently also decreasing the demand for UK insurance. The same mechanism applies to the introduction of import tariffs by the EU-27 on UK goods and services.
Tables 2 and 3 summarize the economic impact of tariffs imposed by the UK on EU-27 products in terms of value added and employment. Both tables contain information on the potential losses for the EU-27 individual countries and the UK, which are obtained by summing across all sectors within the country. We distinguish between a "soft" and a "hard" Brexit, respectively. Columns
(1) and (2) in both tables show the absolute value, in terms of millions of dollars and thousand of people, that would be hypothetically lost in a "soft" Brexit scenario. Whereas Column (1) shows the direct losses for each EU-27 country from lower direct bilateral trade with the UK, Column (2) identifies the losses from reduced indirect trade with the UK via other EU-27 countries. The sum of both channels is found in Column (3). To normalize the magnitude of the loss by country size, Column (4) expresses it as a percentage of the total value added (and employment) of the country 30 . The remainder of the columns document the losses in a "hard" Brexit scenario. It has to be kept in mind that our analysis has been entirely carried out at the sectoral level, whereas in the tables we have aggregated the sector-level effects at the country-level.
For each of the 28 European countries, Table 4 lists the most affected sector in terms of value added and employment. This sector can differ depending on whether we express losses in terms of value added or employment. The reason is that the value added contribution per worker can differ 29 The majority of the bilateral tariffs between European countries have remained unchanged between the period 2000-2014.
30 Total Value Added (TVA) for each country is obtained using the WIOD database.
dramatically across sectors, which means that the same drop in value added might lead to different employment effects in different sectors.
Similarly to the previous tables, Tables 5, 6 and 7 summarize the economic impact of tariffs imposed by the EU-27 countries on the UK. As mentioned above, sectors in the EU-27 countries will be affected by tariffs imposed by the EU-27 on the UK as a part of the production of the EU-27 sectors is embedded in UK exports back to EU-27 countries.
Tables 8 and 9 display the total losses from Brexit, obtained by summing the effects from both UK protection against EU-27 and EU-27 protection against the UK. The results indicate that the UK is hit relatively harder than the rest of the EU-27 in both the "soft" and "hard" Brexit scenario.
In either case, Brexit reduces economic activity in the UK three times more than in the EU-27.
The UK will experience a drop in value added production as a percentage of GDP of 1.21% under For each EU country, Table 10 shows the sector that will be most affected under a "hard" Brexit scenario, which is based on both the direct and indirect effects. These most affected sectors may differ from the ones mentioned in other Brexit studies because in our analysis we have accounted for input-output linkages between goods and services sectors, allowing us to get a more complete picture of the effects of a trade shock. For example, in terms of value added the most affected sector in Germany is "Motor Vehicles", while in terms of employment losses it is "Machinery & Equipment". For the UK (GBR), "Wholesale Trade" is the sector most affected by Brexit in terms of value added, while in terms of job losses it is the service sector "Administrative and support activities".
Discussion
This section compares our results with those found by other papers that investigate the potential impact of Brexit. Emerson et al. (2017) summarize the results of six papers, three academic papers and three from official sources 31 . These studies each consider an optimistic and a pessimistic Brexit scenario that correspond closely to our "soft" and "hard" Brexit scenarios. An important difference is that most of these papers predict the Brexit effects to be fully materialized after a period of about 10 years. Therefore, most of them set the time horizon at the year 2030. In contrast, our approach does not make any assumption on the transition period that is needed to adjust to the new economic climate. The results that we present are the outcome of a static analysis. Therefore, we do not project the impact of Brexit and how that would occur over time, instead we obtain the immediate overall effects that can be expected to materialize.
When we compare our results to the average effect obtained in earlier studies that also consider the impact of Brexit on the EU-27 32 , our simulated value added losses for the EU-27 are approximately three times higher. We find the absolute loss in value added production for the EU-27 to be 1.7
times larger than the UK losses. In a way this should not come as a surprise given that the EU-27 is a much larger economy than the UK. Given the size of the EU-27 economy and the UK's large trade deficit with the EU-27, it seems likely that the EU-27 would suffer larger absolute losses than the UK, but this is not what other studies have found. In earlier studies, the absolute losses for the UK were always higher than for the EU-27.
A potential explanation for the larger absolute losses for the EU-27 in our study is the inclusion of indirect effects. Throughout the paper, we have extensively argued the importance of considering global value chains and value added trade flows rather than bilateral direct gross flows. The indirect losses from Brexit (e.g. decreased Belgian steel production due to reduced German car exports to the UK) are estimated to be very important, amounting to ca. one third of the direct effects 33 .
This is likely to cause the divergence between our results and the other results that circulate in the literature. Our model simulation is bound to yield greater estimated losses given that it captures all 31 See Ottaviano et al. (2014), Aichele and Felbermayr (2015) , the OECD study by Kierzenkowski et al. (2016) , Rojas-Romagosa (2016), Booth et al. (2015) and HMTreasury (2016) . 32 See, for instance, Rojas-Romagosa (2016), Aichele and Felbermayr (2015) , Booth et al. (2015) and Ottaviano et al. (2014) .
33 Tables 2 and 3 display the predicted losses in terms of value added and employment associated with a tariff imposed by the UK on EU-27 goods and services. In these tables, we distinguish between direct and indirect effects as observed by columns (1), (2), (5) and (6). The relative importance of direct and indirect effects differs greatly across countries.
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indirect channels through which a country-sector can be affected in addition to the direct channels captured in the literature. Moreover, our study contains information for all the services sectors, which are typically embedded in many manufactured goods. For sectors within services, the indirect channels are very important which corresponds to an important source of the high losses found in our analysis.
The sector-level dimension of our analysis solves the potential bias obtained in country-level analysis that omits the sectoral structure of an economy. While we present aggregate results at the countrylevel, it should be noted that these were obtained by summing the sector-level effects, which gives us the total country-level losses from Brexit. This differs from other studies that do not consider the sector-level dimension (see, for instance, the model in Noguera, 2012).
Our results, however, are very comparable in terms of the relative losses. In line with other studies, we find the UK to be hit with value added losses that are three times as high as the EU-27 losses, when normalizing by country size.
Our estimates on value added and job losses do not include potential FDI effects of Brexit. Various papers however, seem to suggest that trade effects account for the main part of the Brexit impact 34 .
This is reassuring as it suggests that the main effects of Brexit come through the trade channel
which is what we focus on in this paper. Not including the FDI effects, suggests that our estimates are lower bound estimates of the true impact that Brexit may have, which should be kept in mind 35 .
34 See the OECD study by Kierzenkowski et al. (2016) , HMTreasury (2016), Dhingra et al. (2017) , PwC (2016),
Oxford-Economics (2016).
35 For many multinationals, the UK has been an attractive FDI destination as a way to get access to the EU Single Market given its business-friendly climate (See Dhingra et al. (2016) for a detailed discussion on the impact on FDI).
With the UK leaving the EU, part of this foreign investment will likely be (temporarily) suspended, or diverted to the other EU-27 member states. For instance, the UK will be a less attractive export platform once it leaves the Single Market, as different regulation and standards will complicate the coordination between the UK headquarter and the EU-27 branches.
Conclusion
In this paper we develop and explicitly solve a trade model with worldwide sector-level input-output linkages in production. The model allows us to separately identify all the channels through which tariff changes operate. This results in a new gravity model that overcomes the limitations of a traditional gravity approach and that derives closed form solutions which allow for comparative statics on tariff changes.
In contrast to a traditional gravity approach that solely rests on direct gross exports between bilateral trade partners, our model includes (1) domestic and global value chain linkages between goods and services sectors, (2) bilateral tariffs that affect direct production for a final destination as well as indirect production (shipped via third countries) to a final destination and (3) value added rather than gross production. Including input-output linkages implies that domestic production of intermediates can serve as inputs in foreign products and subsequently be exported "indirectly"
to a final destination. Our input-output model can be taken to the sectoral World Input Output Database (WIOD) and can be used to evaluate trade policy. In this paper, we use the theoretical framework to simulate the impact of different scenarios of Brexit in terms of value added and employment for each of the 28 individual countries involved.
From the sectoral World Input Output (WIOD) database, we obtain Leontief input-output coefficients, value added shares in production and trade flows, which we complement with trade and employment elasticities obtained from the literature. These are all the variables needed to simulate the model's predictions on trade destruction effects resulting from the different scenarios of Brexit.
We consider both a "soft" Brexit, where the UK continues to be part of the single market but faces increased non-tariff barriers (NTBs) (the "Norwegian scenario"), as well as a "hard" Brexit scenario where Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) tariffs between the EU-27 and the UK are put in place. Our model simulations indicate that the UK is hit relatively harder than the rest of the EU-27 in both scenarios. In either case, Brexit reduces economic activity in the UK three times more than in the EU-27.
The UK will experience a drop in value added production as a percentage of GDP of 1.21% under a "soft" Brexit and up to 4.47% under a "hard" Brexit scenario. This corresponds to UK job losses of around 140,000 jobs in the "soft" Brexit and ca. 530,000 jobs in the "hard" Brexit scenario.
For the EU-27, the absolute job losses are larger, with the numbers of EU-27 jobs lost from Brexit varying between ca. 280,000 and 1,200,000 jobs, which corresponds to value added losses as a percentage of GDP of 0.38% for the "soft" and 1.54% for the "hard" Brexit. The losses in value added and jobs differ substantially across EU-27 member states. EU-27 member states that stand to lose most from Brexit are countries with close historical ties to the UK (e.g. Ireland, Malta) and small open economies on the European continent (e.g. Belgium and the Netherlands).
We find that Brexit hits the UK relatively harder than the EU-27. Nonetheless, in contrast to other studies, we find the absolute losses for the EU-27 to be substantially higher both in terms of value added and jobs lost.
The Brexit impact varies across countries due to differences in sectoral composition. As shown by Acemoglu et al. (2012) , it is the network centrality of sectors that determines the impact of an aggregate shock through a "cascade effect" in the input-output network. Under Brexit, we consider different tariffs across sectors, and therefore the propagation of tariff shocks differs depending on the sectoral composition of the economy. A sector that only has a few linkages with other sectors may not affect aggregate output much even when it is subject to high tariffs, as opposed to a sector that is very central in the production network. Our results take the network centrality and the number of sectoral production linkages into account when estimating the loss in value added and jobs caused by Brexit.
Our findings indicate that there are no winners from Brexit, but only losers. Both parties involved would suffer substantial losses if denied free trade access to each other's market. However, while the current belief surrounding Brexit is that especially the UK has a great deal to lose, our sectorlevel input-output approach clearly shows that the EU-27 also stands to lose substantially and considerably more than previously thought. The reason is that EU-27 production networks are closely integrated, which implies that tariff changes with the UK do not just affect direct trade bilateral flows but also indirect trade flows via third countries. These indirect effects are estimated to be very important (typically amounting to ca. one third of the direct effects), which substantially reinforces the trade destruction effects of Brexit. Note: Employment data in Eurostat is missing for some sectors in the following countries: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta and Sweden. Therefore, the presented employment results for these countries will likely underestimate the true impact. Note: See the Appendix for a list of the country name abbreviations and sector codes.
Note: The most affected sector can differ depending on whether we look in terms of value added or employment. The reason is that the value added contribution per worker can differ dramatically across sectors, which means that the same drop in value added might lead to different employment effects in different sectors.
Note: Employment data in Eurostat is missing for some sectors in the following countries: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta and Sweden. Therefore, the presented employment results for these countries will likely underestimate the true impact. Note: Employment data in Eurostat is missing for some sectors in the following countries: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta and Sweden. Therefore, the presented employment results for these countries will likely underestimate the true impact. Note: See the Appendix for a list of the country name abbreviations and sector codes.
Note: Employment data in Eurostat is missing for some sectors in the following countries: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta and Sweden. Therefore, the presented employment results for these countries will likely underestimate the true impact.
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9. Appendix 9.1. Abbreviations 
